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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Sunday Laws
In 1961, a state-wide law to prohibit engaging in certain activities on Sunday was passed by the North Carolina General Assembly.1
The act was declared unconstitutional by the North Carolina Supreme Court in 1962.2 In 1963, the act was rewritten in an effort
to remove the objectionable features from it.3 The rewritten statute
was declared unconstitutional by .the court in 1964. 4 Thus, Sunday
laws are a current issue. This comment-will examine them, their
constitutionality, and the policy questions involved in the hope of
shedding light on their future in North Carolina.5
I. HISTORY
"Every effort to'remodel existing Sunday legislation, or to forecast its future must be made in the light of the past."" The history in recent centuries begins with the fact that secular work on
Sunday was not an offense against the common law.7 Consequently,
1
N.C. Sess. Laws 1961, ch: 1156.
' G I Surplus Store, Inc. v. Hunter, 257 N.C. 206, 125 S.E.2d 764. (1962).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-346.2 (Supp. 1963).
'Treasure City, Inc. v. Clark, 261 N.C. 130, 134 S.E.2d 97 (1964).
' Soon after the cases declaring the state-wide laws unconstitutional, the
court held that a city ordinance which regulated activities on Sunday met
constitutional requirements. Clark's Charlotte, Inc. v. Hunter, 261 N.C. 222,
134 S.E.2d 364 (1964). Local level regulations of this type are free of
many of the defects contained in the state-wide acts which are the subject
of this comment. For discussion of local level Sunday regulation see Note,
32 N.C.L. REv. 552 (1954).
'Preface to LEwIs, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF SUNDAY LEGISLATION at vi
(1888). For the ancient history of regulation of Sunday activity, see Rod-

man v. Robinson, 134 N.C. 503, 506, 47 S.E. 19, 20 (1904); JoHNsoN &
YOST, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES

219-32

(1948).
'Rodman v. Robinson, 134 N.C. 503, 506, 47 S.E. 19, 20 (1904); State
v. Williams, 26 N.C. 400 (1844). It is also interesting to note that Christianity is not theoretically opposed to secular work on Sunday.

[The] organic [law of Christianity] must be found in the New
Testament, and there we shall look in vain for any requirement to

observe Sunday, or indeed any day. The Master's references to the
Sabbath were not in support but in derogation of the extreme observances of the Mosaic day of rest indulged in by the Pharisees.

Rodman v. Robinson, supra at 510, 47 S.E. at 21 (Clark, C.J.) Lewis, an
early writer, agreed, saying that:
The first Sunday legislation.was the product of that pagan conception, so fully developed by the Romans, which made religion a de-
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legal restrictions on activity based upon the fact that the day is
Sunday are found. in stattutory law., English legislation in 1625
prohibited bear-baiting, bull-baiting, common plays, and the leaving
of parishes on Sunday.8 This statute may have been in force in
North Carolina during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.0
,In 1676, the first English statute prohibiting work on Sunday was
enacted."' This enactment became the foundation for nearly all
,Sunday legislation in. the United States. 1 It read:
• For the better observation and keeping holy the Lord's day...
all

...

persons . .. shall on every Lord's day apply themselves

to the observation of the same, by exercising ... the duties of
piety and true religion, publikly and privately ..

. and . . . no

tradesman, artificer, workman, labourer, or other person whatsoever, shall do or exercise any worldly labour, business or work
of their ordinary callings, upon the Lord's day, or any part
thereof (work of necessity and charity only excepted;) ....

12

'In 1715, North Carolina adopted an act "for the better observ,ance of the Lord's Day, called Sunday .

. .

."

This statute was

substantially the same as the 1676 English act. It added a preamble
which clearly indicated why the statute was passed.
Forasmuch as by the great neglect in keeping holy the Lord's

Day, and the little regard had, to all such other days and times
* appointed to be kept religiously, impiety is like to grow to a very
great height '(if.not timely prevented) to the great dishonour of
14
Sthe Almighty ....
Spartment of the state., This was diametrically opposed 'to the genius
of New Testament Christianity. It did not find favor in the Church
until Christianity had been deeply corrupted through the influence
of. Gnosticism and kindred pagan errors.
LEWIS, op. cit. supra note 6, at vi.
8 Lord's Day Act, 1625, 1 Car.

1, c. 1.
One codifier so reported. Collection of Statutes of England in Force
in N.C. 379 (Martin 1792).. It is, however, questionable whether the statute
'as in force because this collection was not entirely accurate. It contained
O

many statutes of England never in force in the colony. Preface to 1 Revised
& Battle 1837).
Statutes at xii (Nash, Iredell
10 Sdnday Observance Act, 1676, 29 Car. 2, c. 7.
" Rodman v. 'Robinson, 134 N.C. 503, 506, 47 S.E. 19, 20 (1904). See
generally 22 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 656 (9th ed. 1887); Johnson,
Legislation, 23 Ky. L.J. 131, 136-37 (1934).
Sunday
1
Sunday Observance Act, 1676, 29 Car. 2, c. 7. (Emphasis added.)
Laws of North Carolina Relating to the Church and Clergy 83 (Trott
t
1721). (Partially italicized in original.)
' Laws of North Carolina Relating to the Church and Clergy 96 (Trott

1721).
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The 1715 act was repealed in 1741"s and replaced by a similar act.1"
It is significant that the 1676 Ehiglish act and the 1715 North
Carolina act called for public and private observance of the "duties
of piety and true religion."'17 The 1741 act did not call for such
private observation, Therein lay the only material difference in the
three statutes. It led, however, to a sharp difference in the interpretations given the acts in England and in North Carolina. At
common law, contracts made on Sunday were valid."8 The English courts held that the 1676 act invalidated contracts- made on
Sunday by persons in the exercise "of their ordinary calling."' 19
The North Carolina court held that a contract nade on Sunday
was valid notwithstanding the 1741 act." The court reasoned that
the 1741 act only regulated public life and only prohibited noisy
labor that disturbed the religious devotion of others. 2 The significance of the 1741 act was reduced also because it lacked sufficient
penalty to discourage its breach." 'For many years the statute was
"almost completely ignored ' 3 It was repealed in 1951.1' North
Carolina finished the decade without state-wide regulation. *In other
CLARK, THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 3 (1904).
1r,23
0

" N.C. Sess. Laws 1741, ch. 14; Collection of All The Public, Acts 142
(Swann 1751); 23 CLARK, Op. cit. supra note 15, at 173. A religiously
oriented preamble is still-seen as part of the statute in I Public Acts 171590, at 52 (Martin 1804), but was dropped in 2 Manual Of The Laws of
N.C. 229 (2d ed. Haywood 1808).
" See the provisions of the English statute in text accompanying note 12
supra, and the North Carolina statute in Laws of North Carolina Rel.ating
to the Church and Clergy 96 (Trott 1721).
(B.R. 1596);
18 Comyns v. Boyer, Cro. Eliz. 485, 78 Eng. Rep: 736
Drury v. DeFontaine, 1 Taunt, 131, 127 Eng. Rep..781, 783-84 (Com. P1.
1808). See generally

CLARK,

CONTRAcTS § 155, at 357 (4th ed. 1931).

" Smith v. Sparrow, 4 Bing. 84, 88, 130 Eng. Rep. 700, 701-02 (Com.
Pl. 1827) ; Fennell v. Ridler, 5 B. & C. 406, 108 Eng. Rep. 151 (K.B. 1826).
State v. Williams, 26 N.C.
2" Melvin v. Easley, 52 N.C. 356 (1860);
400 (1844). Accord, Maxton Auto Co. v. Rudd, 176 N.C. 497; 97 'S.E. 477
(1918); Rodman v. Robinson, 134 N.C. 503, 47 S.E. 19 (1904).
21 Melvin v. Easley, supra note 20, at 359-60. 'Furthermore, private activities on Sunday could not have been regulated by the North Carolina act
because of N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 26: "All persons have a natural and in-

alienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of.-their
own consciences ....

-The offender was not subjected to criminal indictment. State v: Brooksbank, 28 N.C. 73 (1845); State v. Williams, 26 N.C. 400 (1844). Accord,
State v. Medlin, 170 N.C. 682, 86 S.E. 597 (1915) ; State v. White, 76 'N.C.
15 (1877). The sole deterrent was-a civil penalty of one dollar. 1 'Revised
Statutes 607 (Nash, Iredell & Battle 1837).
" State v. McGee, -237 N.C. 633, 638, 75 S.E.2d 783, 786, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 802 (1953).
2

N.C. Sess. Laws 1951, ch. 73..
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states, laws regulating Sunday activity were beginning to be used
for new purposes. With the rise of shopping centers and large
"discount houses" that operate seven days a week from their suburban and country highway locations came a revitalization of the long
-forgotten Sunday laws. These statutes soon faced constitutional
tests.
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY
In McGowan v. Maryland," the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the. convictions of seven employees of a large highway
discount st6re for violating the state Sunday law."0 The main contentiori of the defendants was that the law violated the establishment clause of the first amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. Before ruling on the Maryland statute, Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, speaking for the Court, discussed the relation of Sunday
'laws in general to the establishment clause. After granting that
the early Sunday laws were "motivated by religious forces,1 2 he
made a search of the evolution of these laws to determine "whether
present Sunday legislation, having undergone extensive changes
from the earliest forms, still retains its religious character."20 He
found that the present purpose and effect of most Sunday laws is
to provide a uniform day of rest for all citizens. 0 But it was conceded that the defendants had suffered economic injury allegedly
resulting from. the imposition of a tenet of the Christian religion
'upon them.31 The Court relied upon Everson v. Board of Educ.12
for the principle that a statute which has a primary secular purpose
(projected into effect), consistent with constitutional guarantees,
will be upheld even though it has an incidental, indirect effect that
' 366 U.S. 420 (1961).

'MD. ANN. CODE. art. 27,§ 521 (Supp. 1964). This law prohibits the
Sunday sale of, all merchandise except specified articles including drugs,
gasoline, newspapers, and tobacco.
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... ." This clause was made applicable to the states via the fourteenth
amendment in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
28

366 U.S. at 431.

29Ibid.
*0Id. at 445.
8
tId. at 430.

330 U.S. 1 (1947). In this case the Court upheld a statute authorizing
repayment to parents of the transportation expenses of their children to
public and Catholic schools. Mr. Justice Black, for the Court, recognized
that a religion was incidently benefited and possibly promoted. However,

the primary purpose was found to be the safety of all children and therefore the statute was valid as "public welfare legislation." Id. at 18.
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would be unconstitutional standing alone.83 Therefore, it was concluded that as presently written and administered Sunday laws "bear
no relationship to establishment of religion as those words are used
in the Constitution of the United States." 4 In ruling on the Maryland statute, the Court found it to have the same secular character
as Sunday laws in general and therefore sustained it on the Everson
4
principle a
In the McGowan case, the appellants were held to lack standing
to raise the "free exercise" of religion issue because they did not
allege injury to their religious practices. They alleged economic
injury which was only sufficient to raise the "establishment" issueY5
The Court did consider the "free exercise" issue in Braunfeld v.
Brown." Appellants were Jewish merchants who sued to enjoin
the enforcement of the 1959 Pennsylvania Sunday law. 7 One of
the appellants alleged " that since his religion required closing on
Saturday, it was economically necessary for him to be open on Sunday; that enforcement of the Sunday law would force him to choose
between his religion and his trade; and that the effect would be a
83366 U.S. at 442-45.
2

Id. at 444.
"'[T]he statute's present purpote and effect is not to aid a religion
but to set aside a day of rest and recreation." Id. at 449. Accord, Twio Guys
From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961). Mr.

Justice Frankfurter substantially concurred with the views of the majority,

but decided the establishment issue withotit relying on the Everson case.
The test used by Frankfurter would allow a stronger religious purpose and
effect than did that of the majority. He looked for the "primary end
achieved." 366 U.S. at 466 (separate opinion). If no secular ends served
were "wholly independent of the advancement of religion" the "primary end
achieved" would be religious and unconstitutional. Ibid. This test would
uphold a statute with two independent, primary ends-one secular and one
religious. However, this permissiveness is qualified by his second, cumulative test: if the statute primarily furthers both secular and religious ends
by means unnecessary to the effectuation of the secular ends alone it cannot
be upheld. Id. at 466-67. The tests of Frankfurter are a concession to the
fact that, in practice, the dissection of the direct and indirect motivating
purposes of the legislature-where one purpose is constitutional and another
unconstitutional-is slippery business with the possibility of misadventure
great. Nevertheless, he too searched for purpose and found it to be the
same as did the majority. Id. at 470-505.
" See the discussion by the Court, 366 U.S. at 429. See also Two Guys
From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, supra note 34a, at 592. Frank-

furter agreed with the Court that the appellants in McGowan and Two Guys
lacked standing to raise the "free exercise" issue. McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 468 n.6 (1961).
-2 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.10 (1963).
38 366 U.S. at 601.
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violation of the free exercise clause of the first
Mr.
Chief Justice Warren, announcing the judgment of the Court, found
amendment. a 9

that the direct purpose of. the statute was to achieve a secular goal,
i.e., a uniform day of rest;4 that the "indirect burden" on appellant's religious practice could not be eliminated by adequate alternative means to the secular end;41 and that implementation of the
direct purpose was valid notwithstanding that there was an ihdirect
burden on appellant's religious practice.4 Mr. Justice Frankfurter
"Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion] .... " This clause was made applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
i° 366 U.S. at 607-09.
",Id. at 608. Most of the commentators have disagreed with this finding.
They maintain that a statute allowing an exemption for those who close
on another day for religious reasons would be sufficient to provide a uniform day of rest. See Hopp, Sunday Laws-The McGowan Decision, 13
BAYLOR L. Rnv. 225, 231 (1961) ; O'Toole, The Sunday Laws, 74 ComzmoNwEAL 343, 345 (1961); 30 GEo.

WASH.

L. REv. 363, 368 (1961); 40

TEXAS

L. REv. 702, 707 (1962); 23 U. PirT. L. Rzv. 222, 229 (1961). But see 7
UTAH L. Rxv. 537, 545 (1961). Warren granted that this exemption "may
well be the wiser solution to the problem," but went on to say that it was
not constitutionally necessary to validate the statute. 366 U.S. at 608-09. He
reasoned that the exemption would not help eliminate the atmosphere of
commercial noise and activity; enforcement problems would be more difficult; an economic advantage might be gained by those allowed to open on
Sunday; and employment problems would arise---"exempted employers would
probably have to hire employees who themselves qualified for the exemptioni
because of their own religious beliefs, a practice which a state might feel
to be opposed to its general policy prohibiting religious discrimination in
hiring." Id. at 609. In a separate opinion, Brennan said that the difficulties
were "more fanciful than real." Id. at 615. "[T]he Court . .. has exalted
administrative convenience to a constitutional level high enough to justify
making one religion ... disadvantageous." Id. at 615-16. The administrative problems are not overwhelming in view of the fact that twenty-one of
thirty-four states having general Sunday laws have exemptions of this kind.
rd. at 614. England also has the exemption. Shops Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6,
c. 28, § 53. The exemption was suggested in conjunction with the 1961
North Carolina Sunday law, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-346.2 (Supp. 1963),
but after little discussion was not adopted. Raleigh News and Observer,
June 22, 1961, p. 6, col. 4.
,2 366 U.S. at 607. Accord, Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market,
Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961). The test applied by the Court changes the test
for first amendment'freedoms which was theretofore in use, and to which
Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart would adhere; that is, first amendment freedoms are susceptible to restriction only to prevent great and immediate
danger to interests the state -may lawfully protect. See Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S: 77, 88 (1949)*; Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 561 (1948);
Thomas'v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) ; West Virginia Board of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105, 115 (1943). For discussion of this "preferred position" test for first
amendment freedoms, see 40 TEXAS L. Rnv. 702 (1962);
Has the Court lost the substance of the issue in the direct-indirect test?
A license tax of $15 per year on distributors of religious literature was
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concurred in a separate opinion, treating the "free exercise? --issue
as a balancing question. He found that the -secular -ptirpose - oufweighed and justified the religious injury inflicted.4 "
The four Sunday law cases44 place singular emphasis, on the
search for purpose. They hold that the valid purpose which Sunday
laws may serve is that of providing a uniform day of iest. However, whether any particular statute has a valid purpose in fact -is
difficult to determine. Appropriate to the Sunday law. question is- a
warning of the Court in a different context: "It is impossible for
us to shut our eyes to the fact that many of the laws . . . , wile
passed under what is claimed to be the police power- for the purpose
of protecting the public health or welfarie, are, in reality, passed
for other motives."45 The conclusion reached by the., QUrt concerning the direct purpose of the Sunday, laws has been, severely
criticized for its imperceptiveness. 40 The common defdct in these
held unconstitutional in Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944),
because it was a direct burden on religion. In Braunfeld the indirect burden
was much greater-the possible loss of an entire business enterprise. The
burden imposed on minority religions -vhieh was upheld in Braunfeld is
"certainly more serious economically" than the burden held unconstitutional
in Follett. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 235 (1953), quoted
with approval in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 578 (1961) (dissenting opinion). For further discussion see Donaldson, Freedom 'of Religibn
and the Recent Sunday Closing Law Cases, 3 WILLIAm & MARY L. Rnv.
384, 392 (1961) ; 30 GEO. WASH. L. Rxv. 363 (1961) ; 7 UTAH L. REv. 537
(1961).
" McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 520-22 (1961) (separate opinion
applicable to the Braunfeld case). Douglas disagreed, finding that the fiit
amendment freedoms are absolute and admit of no balancing.' Brennan and
Stewart agreed to the balancing test but differed with Frankfurter in application. "[T]he law requires a 5erson 'to choose between religious" faith
and his economic survival.' This is not something that can b'swept urider
the rug and forgotten in the. interest of enforced Sunday togetherness."
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 615 (1961) (separate opinion of Stewart,
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961)';
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys From Harris6n.Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U:S. 582 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland,
'366 U.S. 420 (1961).
"Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S' 45, 64 (1905) (dictum). ''This- ca'se
held that a labor law of the State of New York which provided that nb
employees in bakeries would be permitted to work 'more than. sixty' houi-s
in a week, or ten hours in a day, was not a legitihate exercise of 'the
police power of the state. 'the Lochner case was overruled by 'Buntinig-v.
Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917). Nevertheless, the merit of the qiioted didf'ui-i
is apparent.
,
"
. ODouglas dissented in all fou'r cases. He said that the, present" Sunday
laws have not outgrown their religious foundations. 366 U.S. at 572-73 &
n.6. "The Court picks and chooses language from various decisions 'o
bolster its conclusion that these Sunday laws in the mbdern- setting are
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criticisms is that they are mere conclusions. The underlying evidentiary facts need to be explored at some length.
The language used in these statutes aids the search for purpose.4 7
It indisputably shows the religious purposes of the early statutes.48
History reveals the gradual disappearance of the religiously oriented
language.4 9 The Supreme Court has used this disappearance as an
indication of the disappearance of religious purpose.5
But such a
conclusion does not follow necessarily. For instance, the North
Carolina Supreme Court, after the 1951 repeal of the 1741 Sunday
'civil regulations.'" 366 U.S. at 572. "Sabbath is no less Sabbath because
it... has come to be expedient for some nonreligious purposes." Id. at 573
n.6. Justice Douglas might well have added the words of Cardinal Cushing,
Archbishop of Boston:
The laws ... reflect the belief of those who formulate them in a
personal God and their acceptance of the age-old tradition that one
day in seven should be set aside as the Lord's Day. It is extremely
disturbing, therefore, to be confronted with this new trend of
thought according to which Sunday is to become legally recognized
as a day on which people may if they choose seek respite from
their ordinary labors.
Quoted in Shaffer, Sunday Selling, 1960 EDITORIAL REsEARCH

REPORTS,

119, 134 (1960). Professor Hanft seems to agree, saying that "[Sunday
observance laws] ... are a part of a continuing stream of religious thought
and expression in the life of the nation." Hanft, The Prayer Decisions, 42
N.C.L. REv. 567, 575 (1964). Professor Louissell praised the Douglas position. He said: "May not ultimately there be in this kind of . . . candor
* . . more
real hope for a modus vivendi in the dilemmas of American

religious pluralism, than in judicial make-believe such as that Sunday laws
are secular?" Louissell, Douglas on Religious Freedom, 73 YALE L.J. 975,
998 (1964). Mi. Justice Brennan characterized the decisions as to purpose
as "encroachments . . . cloaked in the guise of some nonreligious public

purpose." Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 612 (1961) (separate opinion).
For similar thought, see JOHNSON & YOST, op. cit. supra note 6, at 231,
255; PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 42, at 229;8 N.Y.L.F. 403 (1962); 15
OxLA. L. REv. 177 (1962).
"'Justice Frankfurter treats the language as helpful though inconclusive
in Sunday laws. 366 U.S. at 497-98 (separate opinion). It has been suggested that the language used be accorded more weight. See Hopp, supra
note 41, at 228.
" See note 28 supra and accompanying text. The early cases in North
Carolina also reflect the religious purpose. Chief Justice Ruffin spoke of "the
legal injunction of all persons to apply themselves on Sunday to the duties of
religion," in Sloan v. Williford, 25 N.C. 307, 309 (1843) (dictum). (Emphasis added.) However, Ruffin recognized that Sunday laws also served
the purpose of providing relaxation and refreshment. State v. Williams,
26 N.C. 400, 401, 403-04 (1844). See generally BLAKELY, AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS BEARING ON SUNDAY LEGISLATION 53 (:1911); JoHNsoN & YosT,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 222.
"See, e.g., text within note 16 supra. At the time of its repeal, only
the phrase "the Lord's day" remained to give religious connotation to the
1741 North Carolina Sunday law. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 103-1 (1950).
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 434-35, 448 (1961).
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observance act, 51 said that "its repeal in no sense should be construed

as a legislative intent to place the stamp of approval upon the profanation of the Sabbath." 5 This statement indicates that, notwithstanding the disappearance of the religious language, the original
religious purpose of the 1741 act survived until its repeal in 1951.
Sunday laws for religious purposes early presented constitutional difficulties in North Carolina. In 1844, Chief Justice Ruffin said
that "however clearly the profanation of Sunday might be against
the Christian religion, it is not and could not here be made, merely
as a breach of religious duty, an offense. . . ."" He held the 1741

act valid, however, because the Legislature looked upon its violation as detrimental to the State as well as a breach of religious
duty.5 4 More emphasis was put on balancing the needs of society
and the individual in 1904 when Chief Justice Clark said: "The
only ground upon which 'Sunday laws' can be sustained is that in
pursuance of police power the State can and ought to require a
cessation of labor upon specific days to protect the masses from
being worn-out by incessant and unremitting toil." 5

Thus, the

rationale that Sunday laws provide a needed rest from labor did
not originate with the 1961 Supreme Court cases. It arose during
the last century when the needs of labor were truly great and before
laws favorable to labor became common. In 1886, a twelve hour
work day with neither Sunday nor holiday the year round was
prevalent in some occupations. 6 At the turn of the century, the
1 See text accompanying notes 15-24 supra.
" State v. McGee, 237 N.C. 633, 638, 75 S.E.2d 783, 786, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 802 (1953). Chief Justice Ruffin also had characterized
the purpose of the 1741 act as to prohibit the "profanation of Sunday." State
v. Williams, 26 N.C. 400, 402 (1844).
5
Id. at 407.
Ibid.
55
Rodman v. Robinson, 134 N.C. 503, 508-09, 47 S.E. 19, 21 (1904)
(dictum). (Emphasis added.) Accord, State v. McGee, 237 N.C. 633, 640,
75 S.E.2d 783, 788, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 802 (1953). "If . . . the
cessation of labor or the prohibition or performance of any act were provided by statute for religious reasons the statute could not be maintained."
Rodman v. Robinson, supra at 508, 47 S.E. at 21. Nevertheless, religious
reasons continue to induce the enactments. For example, a Charlotte city
councilman after voting to enact a Sunday ordinance said in support of
his action, "'I have been brought up to keep the Sabbath holy!" Charlotte
Observer, March 7, 1964, § A, p. 1, col. 7, at 2, col. 1.
"'LESCOHIER & BRANDEIS, 3 HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES
101 (1935). In 1887 North Carolina children six years old worked as much
as twelve and a half hours a day. DAVIDSON, CHILD LABOR LEGISLATION
IN THE SOUTHERN TEXTILE STATES 105 (1939).
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states had grave doubts about the validity of labor-hours regulation.57 In North Carolina, organized labor had no leverage; the
general trend was in opposition to legislation touching any labor
problem.5 The theory and practice of allowing employers and employees to agree upon whatever terms the labor market dictated
continued into the early part of the twentieth century."0 No doubt
the masses needed any rest the Sunday laws might lend. 0 But has
the situation remained so desperate? During the twentieth century,
the shift away from judicial and governmental inaction has been
so great that a complete cycle in labor relations has occurred." Fortythree states have labor laws regulating either maximum daily hours,
maximum weekly hours, or both. 2 "[F]ederal legislation and collective bargaining contracts have created whole weekends of leisure
These are the true factors that
".6.,"
for most American workers.
LEscoHIER

DAVIDSON,

&

BRANDEIS, op. cit.

supra note 56, at 667.

op. cit. supra note 56, at 109, 112-13. The first attempts

at labor legislation in North Carolina were toward the establishment of a
ten-hbur day in 1887. The bill was speedily tabled. Id. at 103. See generally
id. at 102-21.
" "[Y]ellow dog contracts were originally upheld [1915], state legislation interfering with private contracts, by providing for maximum hours
of work, denounced [1905], and minimum wages legislation for women
invalidated [1923]." FORKOScH, LABOR LAW 15 (1953). See generally
PHILLIPs, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINIscES

94-104 (1960).

" The "theory [that Sunday laws provided a day of rest] had particular
significance during this, nation's period of industrial advancement when
laborers were at a bargaining disadvantage in respect to management."
Note, 39 B.U.L. RZEv. 543, 544 (1959). In practice it is doubtful whether
they had any significant effect because they were not enforced. E.g., State
v. McGee, 237 N.C. 633, 638, 75 S.E.2d 783, 786, appeal dismissed, 346
U.S. 802 (1953). See also State v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 149 N.C.
470, 62 S.E. 755 (1908). Sunday laws are not given a significant role in
labor history. E.g., LESCOHIER & BRANDEIS, op. cit. supra note 56, at 673.
The authors seem uncertain as to whether Sunday laws have any relation
to the protection of labor. There is no treatment of Sunday laws in either
DAVIDSON, op. cit. supra note 56; FORKOSCE, op. cit. supra note 59j LIEN,
LABOR LAW'AND RELATIONS

(1938); or

OAKES, LAW OF ORGANIZED LABOR

(1927).
" The dominant idea today is that of governmental planning for our
resources and labor to yield the maximum social welfare. RoTTscHAEFER,
THE CONSTITUTION AND Socio-EcoNoMIc CHANGE 203 (1948).

" U.S.

DEP'T OF LABOR, GROWTH OF LABOR LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

74 (1962). See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-17 (Supp. 1963). This statute,
originally enacted in 1937, provides in part:
No employer shall employ a female person for more that forty-eight
hours in any one week ... or on more than six days in any period
of seven consecutive days.
'No employer shall employ a male person for more than fifty-six
hours in any one week, or more than twelve days in any period of
fourteen consecutive days . ...
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protect the laboring classes. Whatever ielation Sunday laws had
in former times to the public's health, little remains today."
Further insight into the purpose served by the recent Sunday
laws can be had by examining the major proponents of the legislation. These proponents are usually the downtown merchants associations.65 There have been charges that the Sunday laws have
6
become "a lethal weapon in the economic war of competition."
Today the downtown merchants cannot compete with the highway
discount houses that remain open on Sunday. This fact is true
whether the downtown merchants open on Sunday or retain their
"Brief for the Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae,
p. 3, Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
"Nader, Blue-Law Blues, 192 NATION 499, 508 (1961). By 1940 the
Department of Labor had discounted the usefulness of Sunday laws'to
labor. Ibid.
"The Pennsylvania Retailers' Association intervened in Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). The recent state-wide Sunday law enactments in North Carolina were proposed'by the .North Carolina Merchants
Association. Raleigh-News and Observer, May 24, 1962, p. 1, col. 2. See
also Charlotte Observer, March 17, 1964, § A, p. 5, col. 1; id., March 16,
1964, § B, p. 1, col. 5; id., Feb. 4, 1964, § B, p. 1, col. 8, at 9, col. 1. This
association also filed a brief as amicus curiae in Treasure City, Inc. v. Clark,
261 N.C. 130, 134 S.E.2d 97 (1964). On the local government level, the
Downtown Charlotte Association, "an organization of downtown business
and professional interests," submitted a Sunday closing ordinance to the city
council. .Charlotte Observer, Feb. 4, 1964, § B, p. 1, col. 8, at 9, col. 1.
" Brief for Appellant, p. 28, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
Metropolitan shopping areas have "been the target of a prolific attack by
intown stores which seek to enforce the Sunday laws against their competitors." Ibid. "'[City]

. . .

retail merchants are intensifying a campaign

to force competitors to keep their doors locked on Sundays.'" State v..Fair
Lawn Service Center, Inc., 20,N.J. 468, 476, 120 A.2d 233, 237 (1956)
(dissenting opinion quoting New York Times). See KIRSTEIN, STORES AND
UNIONS 15 (1950); Editorial Note, 12 RUTGERS L. Rtv. 505, 508 (1958).
A former Charlotte city attorney, representing a discount house in.an attack
on a city Sunday ordinance, said that the Sunday laws are economic weapons
aimed at discounters by downtown merchants. Charlotte Observer, Feb. 4,
1964, § B, p. 1, col. 8. See id., March 16, 1964, § B, p. 1, col. 5; id., March
10, 1964, § C, p. 2, col. 5; id., March 2, 1964, § B, p. 1, col. 8; id., Feb.
29, 1964, § B, p. 2, col. 5 (quoting Ashville Citizen editorial); id., Feb. 25,
1964, § B, p. 2, col. 1; id., Feb. 21, 1964, § B, p. 1, col. 5; Raleigh News
and Observer, Nov. 20, 1964, p. 1, col. 2; id., May 24, 1962, p. 1, col. 3;
id., June 22, 1961, p. 1, col. 4. In 1959 the National Council of the Churches
of Christ in the U.S.A. warned member churches against joining the struggle for Sunday laws "sought by economic forces as a means to remove
• . competition, rather than for bona fide [purposes] . . . ." Quoted in
Shaffer, Sunday Selling, 1960 EDITORIAL. RESEARCH REPORTS 119, 123. In

vetoing a 1959 Sunday selling law, -Gov. George Dewey Clyde of Utah
said: "[T]he major support [for the measure] comes, from a group of
retail merchants who are seeking by this means to regulate competition
within their own industry." Quoted in Shaffer, supra at 136.
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present practice of closing.17 The best solution to the downtown
merchants' problem is to seek legislation to eliminate the Sunday
market, thereby causing the billions of dollars now spent yearly
on Sundays6" to be spent on other days, when the downtown merchants are not at such a competitive disadvantage. Could this be
the reason these special interest groups seek Sunday closing laws?
Statements on behalf of the downtown merchants indicate that if
legislation is not passed removing Sunday competition they will
themselves open on Sunday in an effort to capture at least part of
the Sunday market.6" Therefore, in proper perspective it seems that
competition, not labor, is in the forefront of the proponents' collective mind.
If the primary purpose of the Sunday laws is to enable the
downtown merchants to compete, with certain religions and labor
benefitting only incidentally, can the act withstand the constitutional tests, assuming the purpose is projected into effect? Generally,
the courts give considerable weight to the decision of the legislature
when the police power is involved.7

In Tyson v. Banton,71 Mr.

" Most downtown stores could not compete beyond the city limits by

opening their own doors on Sunday. Some were forbidden to do
so under ordinances that did not apply in adjacent areas; even if
there was no legal bar to opening, the downtown location was a
handicap on a day when families took to the road. A number of
big stores tried to meet the competition by taking telephone orders
for articles advertised in the Sunday newspapers. Others opened
branches in the suburbs to get the Sunday trade.
Shaffer, supra note 66, at 120-121; See generally Editorial Note, 12 RUTGERS
L. Rnv. 505, 509 (1958)..
o'Shaffer, supra note 66, at 121.
69 "If these seven-day discount stores are permitted to continue to remain open on Sunday and the other six days of the week, it will become
necessary for other stores to likewise open on Sunday to compete." Brief
for the North Carolina Merchants Ass'n as Amicus Curiae, p. 20. Treasure
City, Inc. v. Clark, 261 N.C. 130, 134 S.E.2d 97 (1964). "The retail
mercantile field is highly competitive. If one store is wide open .. . others
must follow." Raleigh News and Observer, Nov. 20, 1961, p. 1, col. 4
(attorney for appellee in oral argument of Treasure City). See State v.
Fair Lawn Service Center, Inc., 20 N.J. 468, 476, 120 A.2d 233, 237 (1956)
(Jersey City Merchants Council solution-a new state Sunday law). The
President of the Raleigh Merchants Bureau said: "Rose's in Charlotte does
some $60,000 on Sunday. . . . A man has to protect himself and remain

open or seek legislation." Raleigh News and Observer, May 24, 1962, p. 40,

col. 3. To the same effect see Charlotte Observer, March 10, 1964, § A, p.
1, col. 8, at 2, col. 3 (President of Charlotte Merchants Association).
" Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); Mays v. Burgess, 147
F.2d 869, 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 896 (1945); Harlow v.
Ryland, 78 F. Supp. 488, 493 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 172 F.2d 784 (8th Cir.
1949); First Nat. Bei. Soc. v. Garrison, 58 F. Supp. 972, 982 (S.D. Cal.),
aff'd, 155 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1946).
"'273 U.S. 418 (1927).
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Justice Holmes said
the proper course is to recognize that a state legislature can do
whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some express
prohibition in the Constitution of the United States or of the
State, and that Courts should be careful not to extend such prohibitions beyond their obvious meaning by reading into them conceptions of2 public policy that the particular Court may happen to
entertain.7
Mr. Justice Holmes's fear that the courts will dip into political
questions should not, however, Iprevent courts from recognizing the
limitations upon the use of the police power.
To justify the State in ... interposing its authority ... it must

appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of
protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private
business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon
73
lawful occupations.
Essential for the exercise of police power is that protection of a
specific public interest is more important than the social interest
in personal liberty.74 The public interest to be protected by the
present Sunday laws is a vague, general one. 715 On the other hand,
Id. at 446 (dissenin opinion).
"Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894). This is the classic
statement of the specific criteria for a valid exercise of the police power.
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594'(1962).
' See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111-113 (1928);
Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 513 (1924); Aaron v.
McKinley, 173 F. Supp. 944, 950 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd sub norm. Faubus v.
Aaron, 361 U.S. 197 (1959). The balancing problem is discussed in State
v. Lawrence, 213 N.C. 674, 684, 197 S.E. 586, 592 (1938) (dissenting
opinion). In State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949), the
court relied on the dissent "of acknowledged power and force of reason"
in Lawrence to hold that a statute which required professional photographers to be licensed was beyond the police power. Id. at 767, 51 S.E.2d
at 733. See generally WILLIs, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
728 (1936); Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme
Court, 40 HARv. L. REv. 943 (1927).

" In the Braunfeld case, Brennan asked
what overbalancing need is so weighty in the constitutional scale
that it justifies this substantial . . . limitation of appellants' free-

dom? It is not the desire to stamp out a practice deeply abhorred

by society .... It is not even the interest in seeing that everyone
rests one day a week .... It is the mere convenience of having
everyone rest on the same day.
366 U.S. at 614 (separate opinion).
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the very real and positive benefits to the particular group at the
expense of a loss of liberty by, citizens generally is quite tangible.70
It seems axiomatic that the police power cannot beused where the
primary purpose is not the health, safety, welfare, or morals of the
public but rather is to suppress competition.77 When the primary
7' In State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1940), Justice Seawell vained'against the efforts of pressure groups.
[T]he importance of personal liberty is under constant attrition,
in the desire for more sweeping governmental control in private
affairs and ih the development of pressure groups which are unable
to, reach their objectives through voluntary association and, for
reasons not entirely altruistic, demand the powerful aid of the law.
The usual symptom is an endemic desire to have the public pro.tected ... although the public is not sensible of any harm.., or
any need of protection. This beau geste should not blind the Court
to the fact, when it exists, that the kind of protection afforded...
is more related to obvious 'benefits accorded to the group in its
private--characterthan to the merely colorable advantage to the
public.
Id. at 762, 6 S.E.2d at 865. (Emphasis.added.) See also Hanft & Hamrick,
Haphazard Regimentatiox Under Licensing, Statutes, 17 N.C.L. REv. 1, 10
(1938). This article shows that many licensing statutes, while ostensibly
for" the protection of public ivelfare, are for the real motive of keeping
down competition. As long as the legislature continues to serve the aims
of pressure groups in the name of public welfare "a horde of guardians
6f th6 public'health, safety, morals, and welfare will continue to crowd
forward." Id. at 18.
"H. P. Hood & Sons,.Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949);
'Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S.'307, 315 (1925). In Ex parte Boebme, 12
Cal. App. 2d 424, 55 P.2d 559 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936), D was convicted
under a Sunday law prohibiting barber shop operation more than six days
a week. The court reversed the conviction. Citing the State's one-in-seven
labor law- to show that the barber shop closing law was not to provide a
uniform day of rest, the court-said: "It seems apparent to us that the real
object

. . .

was not to prescribe one day of rest in seven for barbers, but

plainly to restrict competition among the owners of th6 shops. Such an
object is certainly not withirr the police power .... ." Id. at -, 55 P.2d at 562.
However, many courts have not agreed with the finding of the Boehme
'case. See Two Guys from Harrison, Inc. v. Furman, 32 N.J. 199, 160 A.2d
265 (1960). In this case, the court dismissed the allegation that the statute
sought to protect the urban merchant from his highway adversary by declaring that it had no way of, knowing that such was the purpose, and
that this contention was in the realm of conjecture. Id. at 227-28, 160
A.2d at 280. In Gundaker Central Motors, Inc. v. Gassert, 23 N.J. 71, 127
A.2d 566 (1956), the court reasoned that since all sellers of -the proscribed
goods were required to close there was no economic advantage gained
and therefore the guarantee of equal protection was met. Id. at 81, 127
A.2d at 572. The reasoning is not sound. Suppose A and. B compete in X
industry. A adopts a- new practice to gain a competitive advantage over
B which B cannot: make up by also adopting the same practice. B seeks
and:gets police power legislation barring the use of the practice in X industry. Can it be said that no economic advantage has been gained by B?
See note 67 supra-for the indication that the supposition is a true reflection
of the facts surrounding the present Sunday law controversies between the
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purpose of an act is to suppress. competition, the fact that the act
would incidentally serve an end permissible to .the stater i.e, provid78
ing a day of rest, ought not save it.

III. WHERE NORTH CAiAOLINA STANDS
The success of the merchants associations in North Carolina,
proposers of the recent Sunday sales acts,7 9 has been prevented only
by the North Carolina Supreme Court. The 1961 actso was a substantial copy of the Pennsylvania Sunday law"' upheld by the United
82
States Supreme Court in the 1961 cases. A day of rest is ordered
highway discount houses (represented by A) and the downtown merchants
(represented by B).
"oStress must be laid on the use of the word "incidentally" here. The
word is used in the sense that the unconstitutional, primary -purpose
and effect so overshadow the indirect effect that the indirect effect does
not bear a reasonable relation to the service of an end permissible to the
state. An example is Pierce v. Society'of Sisters; 268 'U.S. 510 (1925). In

this case an Oregon law which made it compulsory for children to attend
public schools was held to be beyond the limits of the police power and therefore unconstitutional. Although some public good might have come from the
act, the infringement upon the private interests of parochial schools so
overshadowed the possible public good that the act was held to bear no
reasonable relation to a purpose within the competency of the state. Id. at
535.
The police power is in derogation of personal liberty, and exteids only
to those measures enacted for the good of all citizens that have a substantial
,(not merely an incidental) relation to the public health, morals, safety,
or general welfare. State v. Williams, 253 N.C. 337, 117 S.E.2d 444 (1960)
(statute requiring license to solicit students for private schools held unconstitutional); State v. Brown, 250 N.C. 54, 108 S.E.2d 74 (1959)
(aesthetic conditions alone insufficient to support police power); Roller v.
Allen, 245 N.C. 516, 96 S.E.2d 851 (1957) (exercise of police power to
require a license to lay tile unconstitutional); State v. Ballance, 229 N.C.
764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949) (police power requiring license to practice
photography unconstitutional).
, See note 65 supra.
"'N.C. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 1156, § 1. It provides in part:
Any person, firm or corporation who engages on Sunday in the

business of selling, or sells or offers for sale, on such day, at retail,
clothing and wearing apparel, clothing accessories, furniture, housewares, home, business or office furnishings, household, business oroffice appliances, hardware, tools, paints, building and lumber supply
materials, jewelry, silverware, watches, clocks, luggage, musical
instruments and recordings, excluding novelties, toys, souvenirs, and
articles necessary for making repairs and performing services, shall,
upon conviction thereof be fined or imprisoned in the discretion
of the court.
8'PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.10 (1963).
82 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys From Har'isonAllentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961). See notes 35-43 supra
and accompanying text. The constitutionality of the statute considered as
an economic weapon to suppress competition was not decided.....
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only for those who sell at retail a specific list of goods, harmless
in themselves. All of the items prohibited from sale on Sunday
may be manufactured or processed on Sunday; all of the myriad
other articles may be made, processed, advertised, and sold on Sunday; every form of worldly employment may be pursued except the
sale of the condemned items. The idea that the 1961 act is designed
to protect a day of rest when it only partly closes the places that
sell the specified goods, allows the the sale of countless other articles,
and virtually grants a public license to all other forms of
commercial and industrial business to operate on that day with
actual financial advantage, contains within itself its negation.8 3 The
pretension that the statute is to provide a day of rest should not
be allowed to hide the obvious fact that the statute is aimed at highway discount houses.8 4
In G I Surplus Stores, Inc. v. Hunter, 5 four highway discount
houses operating on Sunday sought to enjoin enforcement of the
1961 act on the sole ground that it was unconstitutionally vague,
uncertain, and indefinite. On appeal from a judgment below dismissing the action, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed.
The clause in the act allowing the sale of "articles necessary for
making repairs and performing services"' 5 was deemed so vague
that "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application."8 " Therefore, said the
court, the act violated article I, section 17, of the North Carolina
Constitution s0a and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. The reasoning of the court centered the vagueness charge on the word "necessary." Much reliance
was placed on a 1962 Kansas case which held the phrase "other
"These arguments were made against a similar statute in Two Guys

from Harrison, Inc. v. Furman, 32 N.J. 199, 250-52, 160 A.2d 265, 292-93
(1960) (dissenting opinion).
8As the Court said in Two Guys, "'[T]he types of commodities covered
by this new enactment are principal categories of merchandise sold in these
establishments which have made the problem of Sunday retail selling newly
acute.'" 366 U.S. at 590-91 (appellant operated a large highway discount
department store).
257 N.C. 206, 125 S.E.2d 764 (1962).
"' See note 80 supra.
86 257 N.C. at 213, 125 S.E.2d at 769.
" This section of the constitution provides: "No person ought to be
taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or
outlawed or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty or property,
but by the law of the land."
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articles of immediate necessity""s unconstitutionally vague ss Although the North Carolina court expressly decided only that the.
means used to implement the end were unconstitutional, considerable insight into the feeling of the court concerning the nature and
constitutionality of that end can be had by a closer examination
of the decision.
The court might easily have avoided declaring the act unconsti-"
tutional. The discount houses sought a constitutional test of the
act in an injunctive suit. The general rule is that the constitutionality of an act cannot be challenged in a suit to enjoin its enforce-'
ment. s° The court, however, said. an exception to the rule is allowed
"when it clearly appears ... . that .... fundamental human right
are denied in violation of constitutional guarantees. 90 There are
few cases extending this exception to the general rule to suits based
on the "void for vagueness" doctrine, perhaps because freedom
from vagueness 'was not always recognized as a constitutional
guarantee."1 It was originally only a non-decisive part of the rule
of strict construction of criminal statutes. 2 Today, however, it .has
crystallized into an imposing doctrine of constitutional law based
either on the requirement of sepairation of powers93 or a section of
"Kan. Sess. Laws 1859, ch. 28, § 249.
" State v. Hill, 189 Kan. 403, 369 P.2d 365 (1962). The Kansas court'
said "necessity" has no generally understood objective meaning; that it
only had relative, subjective meaning. Therefore it failed to inform men
of common intelligence what conduct would render them liable to penalties,
80 257 N.C. at 214, 125 S.E.2d at 770.
-912go Ibid.
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4920,.
at 448 (3d ed.
1943). However, such is not to say that the extension is not presently
recognized as sound, for in Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), state
loyalty oath statutes were declared unconstitutional for vagueness in an
injunctive suit. Accord, Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S.
278 (1961). This point concerning the form of action is raised merely to
shed light on the inclination of the North Carolina court.
9"United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 486 (1948). For instance, in
Patten v. Aluminum Castings Co., 105 Ohio St. 1, 136 N.E. 426 (1922),
21 MI H. L. REv. 831, a statute was declared void for vagueness independently of constitutional restriction upon legislative action since the required
number of judges did not concur in order to declare a statute unconstitutional. See generally Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal;
40 CORNELL L.Q. 195 (1955); Note, 23 IND. L.J. 272 (1948); Note, 109
U. PA. L. Rlv. 67 (1961); 38 HRv. L. Rzv. 963 (1925).
" If the statute is so uncertain that a court would have to rewrite it to
enforce it, the court should refuse to usurp the legislative function. Cline
v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927). See generally Collings, supra
note 92.
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It is usually stated: The terms of a penal
a state constitution.
statute creating an offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform
with reasonable certainty those who are subject to it what conduct
is to be penalized. 5 This is the pot calling the kettle black, for the
doctrine is itself too vague to command any consistency in the
cases.9 A court may rely on often repeated phrases either to strike
down a statute97 or to uphold it s without really making a peneCONST. art. I, § 17, quoted in note 86a supra.
.. E.g., G I Surplus Store, Inc. v. Hunter, 257 N.C. 206, 211, 125 S.E.2d

"See, e.g., N.C.

764, 768 (1962).
". "[B]oth sides cite and rely on the same cases to support their . . .
diametrically opposed, positions." Harvey v. Priest, 366 S.W.2d 324, 327

(Mo. 1963).

"7"The dividing line between what is lawful and unlawful cannot be
left, to conjecture." Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 393
(1926). "[I]t will not do to hold an average man to the peril of an
indictment for the unwise exercise of his . . . knowledge involving so many
factors of varying effect that neither the person to decide in advance nor
the jury to try him after the fact can safely and certainly judge the results."
Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 465 (1927). For similar rationale,
see State v. Hill, 189 Kan. 403, 369 P.2d 365 (1962); GI Surplus Store,
Inc. v. Hunter, 257 N.C. 206, 212, 125 S.E.2d 764, 769 (1962).
""That there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to determine
the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls is no sufficient
reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal offense."
United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947). "[T]he law is full of
ibstances where a man's fate depends on his estimating -rightly, that is, as
the jury subsequently estimates it." Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373,
377 (1913) .(Holmes, J.). Compare the quotations cited in note 97 supra.
Compare Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 257 N.C. 367, 371, 126 S.E.2d 92,
q5"(1962) and State v. Hales, 256 N.C. 27, 33, 122 S.E.2d 768, 773 (1961)
(hoplifting statute held not vague), with G I Surplus Store, Inc. v.
Hunter, 257 N.C. 206, 212-13, 125 S.E.2d 764, 768-69 (1962).
Line-drawing distinctions based on particular words used in a statute
do' not completely account for the lack of consistency in the cases. The
line-drawing technique usually explores the countervailing pressures which
require a line to be drawn somewhere. Those countervailing pressures in
the vagueness are on the one hand to allow the legislature to use flexible
standards to insure effective application of legislative policy and on the
other 'hand to insure that the standards- used provide workable guidelines.
for those administering and subject to them. The "void for vagueness"
cases have not generally reflected these line-drawing pressures. See Cardinal
Sporting Goods Co. v. Eagleton, 213 F. Supp. 207, 219 (E.D. Mo. 1963).

Their "habitual lack of informing reasoning" gives them a "pool-rack-hung-

up appearance." Note, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 70-71 (1960). In the G I
Surplus case the North Carolina court did not discuss whether the phrase
"'necessary for making repairs and performing services" resulted from the
nature of the subject matter, which may impose limitations on exactitude in
phrasing in order to implement policy, or from sloppy draftsmanshipwhich often happens with "floor" amendments; nor whether the vital word
'necessary" had been previously employed with success by the legislature;
nor whether the phrase must be sufficiently certain to the average man or
only to the trained minds of judges. See generally 45 HARv. L. Rn~v. 160
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141,

trating analysisof whether the statute conveys sufficient meaning. 99
This possibility makes the concept of vagueness an "available instrument in the service of other ... judicially felt needs and pressures" that control the cases and relegate the vagueness of the
statutory words to incidental significance.'
These "spurious void
for vagueness" cases seem, to have their actual basis in either
of two settings: (1) a state imposing more prohibitory regulation
than it has a constitutional right to impose,' or (2) a court actually deciding policy questions avoided in the written opinion as "political, questions."' 2 These uses of the doctrine, although tending to
minimize the number of occasions a court must expressly reach
issues of ultimate power, tend to veil the real issue when used in
the first kind of case and usurp the legislative function when used
in the second' 0 3
Evidence that the North Carolina Supreme Court had the first
of these uses at least "in the back of its mind" in the G I Surplus
case is not wanting. It is found in the language quoted with approval by the court: " '[A] rbitrary interference with private business and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations are not
within the police powers of the state.' "'04
(1931) (arguing that certainty to judges is sufficient). -s it not just as
prejudicial to an individual to measure his rights by vague standards as it
is to penalize him with vague statutes?
"Mr. Justice Holmes said that "it is one of the misfortunes of the
law that ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafter for a long time
cease to provoke further analysis." Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347,
391 (1912) (dissenting opinion).
100 Note, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 75 (1960).
See Collings, supra, note
92, at 212-14 (that this use dominates the doctrine).
...[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine may be regarded less as a
principle regulating the permissible relationship between written

law and the potential offender than as a practical instrument mediating betwyeen, on the one hand, all of the organs of public coercion
of a state and, on the other, the institution of federal protection of
the individual's private interests.

Note, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 81 (1960).

1022 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4920, at 447 (3d ed. 1943)
("antagonisms to legislative policy rather than uncertainty concerning legislative meaning"); Collings, supra note 92, at 195; Note, 23 IND. L.J. 272,

284 (1948).
...
See generally State v. Hales, 256 N.C. 27, 30, 122 S.E.2d 768, 770
(1961); Note, 23 IND. L.J. 272, 285 (1948).
257 N.C. at 210, 125 S.E.2d at 767. The Supreme Court upheld a
Pennsylvania Sunday law which only prohibited "certain business activities" in Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S.

582 (1961). However, the Court made it clear that in Pennsylvania the
statute simply supplemented prior regulation which prohibited af worldly
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The questionable application of the vagueness doctrine to the
phrase "necessary for making repairs and performing services" also
indicates that the court was doing more than merely insuring fair
notice. Words that have a long history of use are generally not
declared vague.' 0 The concept of excepting necessary activities
from the operation of Sunday laws dates from the 1676 English
act °6 and today appears in all states that have some sort of general
Sunday law.' 07 A substantial body of courts, including the North
Carolina Supreme Court, 10' have construed the exception for necessary activity without finding it so desperately unworkable as to be
unconstitutional.'
Most courts today reject the vagueness attack
because they find the word "necessary" in the context of Sunday
laws sufficiently definite." 0 Indeed, the United States Supreme
employment. Id. at 590. The North Carolina court spent three paragraphs
of the G I Surplus opinion to point out that the 1961 act does not prohibit
"all occupations generally" on Sunday, but only "certain business activities." 257 N.C. at 210-11, 125 S.E.2d at 767 (1962). This has nothing
to do with vagueness. It is apparent recognition of the trend in other
jurisdictions to hold that "Sunday closing laws which are less than universal
in their application are unrelated to a universal day of rest in any manner
substantial enough to satisfy due-process requirements." Comment, 4 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 465, 471 (1957) (citing cases from California, Colorado,
Florida, Nebraska, New York and Oklahoma).
...
Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans, 297 U.S. 216, 220-21

(1936) (Cardozo, J.). See also Campbell v. City of New York, 244 N.Y.

317, 325, 155 N.E. 628, 630 (1927) (Cardozo,J.).
10' See text accompanying note 12 supra.
"'McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 551 (1961) (Appendix II to
separate
opinion
of Frankfurter,
1o" State
v. Southern
Ry., 119J.).
N.C. 814, 25 S.E. 862 (1896) (involving
necessity of operation of trains on Sunday).
'09In general, "necessary" in the context of Sunday laws is something
short of absolute or physical need but something more than merely needful,
desirable, and convenient. Williams v. State, 167 Ga. 160, 162-63, 144 S.E.
745, 746 (1928); Ungericht v. State, 119 Ind. 379, 380-81, 21 N.E. 1082,
1083 (1889); Ex parte Seward, 299 Mo. 385, 403, 253 S.W. 356, 360
(1923), appeal dismissed sub nons. Seward v. Brady, 264 U.S. 599 (1924);
State v. James, 81 S.C. 197, 200, 62 S.E. 214 (1908).
OHIo LEGISLATIVE
SERVICE CoMMISSION, SUNDAY PROHIBITIONS 8-11 (1963) (on file in N.C.
Institute of Government Library). The fact that no exact definition of general application can be framed does not constitute vagueness. Great Am. Ins.
Co. v. Johnson, 257 N.C. 367, 371, 126 S.E.2d 92, 95 (1962).
110 Cardinal Sporting Goods Co. v. Eagleton, 213 F. Supp. 207 (E.D.
Mo. 1963); State v. Fantastic Fair, 158 Me. 450, 186 A.2d 352 (1961);
Marks Furs, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 365 Mich. 108, 112 N.W.2d 66 (1961);
Commonwealth v. Bauder, 188 Pa. Super. 424, 145 A.2d 915 (1958) ; Mandell
v. Haddon, 202 Va. 979, 121 S.E.2d 516 (1961); Rich v. Commonwealth,
198 Va. 445, 94 S.E.2d 549 (1956). The cases holding that the exemptions.
allowing necessary activity are too vague to be construed are recent and
parallel the use of the Sunday laws as an economic weapon to suppress
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Court did not find the "necessary" exception contained in one of
the two acts challenged in Two Guys Fron Harrison-Allentown,
Inc. v. McGinley"' to be vague. In that case, the Court upheld two
Pennsylvania Sunday acts. 1 2 The first of these acts". did not contain an exception for necessary activity. With the addition of the
"necessary" exception, it is the act that North Carolina adopted.""
The North Carolina General Assembly obviously adopted a copy of
the Pennsylvania act because the act had been upheld against constitutional attack. The addition of the "necessary" exception was not
thought of as endangering the constitutionality of the act." 5 The
legislature's confidence was justified because the second Pennsylvania act" 6 involved in Two Guys contained a "necessary" exception
that was upheld also. Although the second act was not expressly
attacked as being void for vagueness, the Court must have ruled
on the issue inferentially. Since the core of the "void for vagueness"
doctrine is that the act is so vague as to be unworkable and meaningless, the Court by implication rejected that view merely by finding the act to be valid and workable.
The word "necessity" has legal significance in such areas as
constitutional law,"17 contracts," 8 county government finance,"
competition. See State v. Hill, 189 Kan. 403, 369 P.2d 365 (1962); Harvey
v. Priest, 366 S.W.2d 324 (Mo. 1963); G I Surplus Store, Inc. v. Hunter,
257 N.C. 206, 125 S.E.2d 764 (1962); State v. Woodville Appliance, Inc.,
171 11N.E.2d
565 (Ohio Dist. Ct. 1960).
366 U.S. 582, 585, 590 (1961) (by implication).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4699.4, .10 (1963).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.10 (1963).
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 1156.
See ESSER, RESPONSIBILITY OF COUNTY BOARDS OF COMMIssIONERs
UNDER CHArE 1156, 1961 SESsioN LAWS 3 (1962) (on file N.C. Institute
111

of Government Library), saying that "obviously this amendment [the "nec-

essary" exception] is vague and subject to a wide range in interpretation
but there is no indication in the opinions of the [United States] Supreme
Court that addition of the exclusion would result in tipping the scales
toward invalidity."
'117PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.4 (1963).
..Mr. Chief Justice Marshall rejected the "absolutely indispensable"
definition of "necessary" as used in the necessary and proper clause of the
United States Constitution. He said:
Almost all compositions contain words, which, taken in their rigorous sense, would convey a meaning different from that which is
obviously intended. It is essential to just construction, that many
words which import something excessive, should be understood in
a more mitigated sense-in that sense which common usage justifies. The word "necessary" is of this description.
McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 414 (1819).
. "'See Overman
& Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 193 N.C. 86, 136 S.E.
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domestic relations, 120 infants' rights, 2 1 municipal corporation expenditures;'2 2 -labor,t m possession of real property, 124 pleading and
parties, 1 25 taxation, 1 26 and wills. 127 Furthermore, in State v. Black250 (1927) (candies, tobacco not necessaries under surety bond of highway
contract).
11. See Denny v. Mecklenburg County, 211 N.C. 558, 191 S.E. 26 (1937)
(dwellings for the use of teachers were not "necessary equipment" within
statute allowing county bonds for same).
E.g., Berry v. Henderson, 102 N.C. 525, 528, 9 S.E. 455, 456 (1889)
(dictum concerning "necessities" husband has duty to provide).
...
In Barger v. M. & J. Finance Corp., 221 N.C. 64, 18 S.E.2d 826
(1942), an infant was allowed to recover money paid on a contract during
-minority because the article purchased was not "among those necessaries
for which a minor may be held liable." Id. at 66, 18 S.E.2d at 827. Accord,
'Jordan v. Coffield, 70 N.C. 110 (1874).
",There are a great many North Carolina cases construing the "necessary expense" provision of N.C. CoNST. art. VII, § 7. This provision forbids
North Carolina municipal corporations spending tax money on expenses
other than "necessary expenses" without a vote of the people. Compare
Mayo v. Commissioners of Town of Washington, 122 N.C. 5, 29 S.E. 343
(1898) (finding that street lights were not a necessary expense), with
Fawcett v. Town of Mt.Airy, 134 N.C. 125, 45 S.E. 1029 (1903) (overruling the Mayo case).
1.. Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 129-30 (1944).
Compare
Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942) (maintenance employees
necessary and therefore within the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act) -andBorden -Co. v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679 (1945), with 10 East 40th
St. Bldg., Inc. v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578 (1945) (maintenance employees
,here held not necessary in the same context).
12
-Swink v.,Horn, 226 N.C. 713, 717, 40 S.E.2d 353, 356 (1946) (necessity required to recover property subject to wartime rent controls).
"'E.g., Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y. v. Basnight, 234 N.C. 347, 352, 67
S.E.2d 390, 394-95 (1951)
(Ervin, J., defining "necessary parties");
Pegram v. Wachovia-Bank & Trust Co., 219 N.C. 224, 225, 13 S.E.2d
249-50 (1941).
1
"There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade
or business. . . ." INT. Rav. CoDE of 1954, § 162(a). See Mich. Improvement Ass'n v. Rockwood, 60-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9380 (D.N.D. 1960);
•Montgomery v. United States 63 Ct. Cl. 588 (1927). See generally 1964
P-H FED. TAx SERv. 11033.
S"'In
Whitfield v. Garris, 134 N.C. 24, 45 S.E. 904 (1903), the court
said "'that an heir at law can only be disinherited by express devise or neces,.sary implication, and that implication has been defined to be such a strong
probability that an intention to the contrary cannot be supposed."' Id. at 26,
45 S.E. at 905. (Emphasis added.)
Although some of these uses do not involve criminal statutes, it does
not seem that they should be distinguished on that fact alone. The rationale
of State v. Hill, 189 Kansas 403, 411, 369 P.2d 365, 371 (1962); State v.
Hales, 256 N.C. 27, 33, 122 S.E.2d 768, 772-73 (1961), that the "void for
vagueness" doctrine requires criminal statutes to be more certain than civil
statutes is not entirely sound. It has modern basis in the principle that
"clearer warning should be given where the conduct will invoke sanctions
of greater severity." Note, 62 HARv. L. Rav. 77, 85 (1948). A light
-,criminal fine is -not as severe as many civil consequences resulting from

1964]

,145

NOTES AND COMMENTS

welder, 2 ' the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld a superior
court determination that a municipal ordinance which prevented the
selling of a meal on Sunday was an "oppressive ... unr.eaonable
exercise of the police pow.er ....

The rationale of the supreme

court is contained in one sentence: "[T]he ordinance in question
makes no exception as to 'works of necessity,' among which is
generally listed, 'keeping open a .. .dining-room.'

"1so

Therefore, it can be concluded that the court in the GI Surplus
case could have held the injunctive suit not proper for a decision
on the constitutionality of the act; that the court used a doctrine
to declare the act unconstitutional which has previously seen substantial use in expressing motivating forces not explicitly spelled
-out in the decisions; and that such forces may have motivated, the
decision in the GI Surplus case since the application of the doctrine
to the 1961 act-solely as a means of getting rid of a yague statute
-was highly questionable. The court has been criticized for not
trying to construe the clause held vague- in GI Surplus.'"' Perhaps
construction of the word "necessary" in a statute.,'See Tank Truck Rentals,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958) ("ordinary and necessary" expense decision involving $41,000); Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90

(1952) (same involving $124,000). It should be noted here, however, that

civil fines
do not always carry the onerous consequences of a criminal record.
186 N.C. 561, 120 S.E. 196 (1923).
Id. at 563, 120 S.E. at 197.
...
Ibid. The court in Blackwelder seems to make the "'necessary" exception a constitutional mandate. If so it has the support of McQuillin,
who says "certain exceptions -[to Sunday law prohibitions] must be .made.
For example, articles or works of necessity ...may and must be excepted."
128

6 MCQuILLImN, MuNIcIPAL Conron-vTiNs § 24.193, at 777 (1949).

Yet

in G I Surplu= the court said the statute violated constitutional guarantees
because it contained the "necessary" exception. Affording Blackwelder the
least possible weight, it can be said that the court approved of the exception
for "works of necessity." "Works of -necessity" might include endless types
of work-not merely selling, endless types of sales-not merely retail sales
of specific articles, and endless types of necessity-not merely necessary
repairs and services. It seems, then, that the phrase deemed essential by
the court in Blackwelder could be considered more vague .than .the phrase
involved in the G I Surplus decision.
""1 See Cardinal Sporting Goods Co. v. Eagleton, 213 F. Supp. 207, 219
(E.D. Mo. 1963). The tradition of painstaking construction is strong -in
North Carolina. "The court must use every authorized means to . . . give
... intelligible meaning ...." State v. Partlow, 91 N.C. 550, 553 (1884).

Intrinsic language difficulties .cause problems of meaning in anything that
may be written. The giving of meaning is the "'essence of the business ,of
judges." Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of -Statutes, 47
CoLum. L. REv. 527, 528 (1947). Although a court is not at liberty to
supply meaning where it is impossible to solve the doubt, the court should
avoid "abstract notions about 'indefiniteness."' Winters v. Nlew York, 333

U.S. 507, 526 (1948) (Frankfuter, J., dissenting).
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*the lack of emphasis the court put on construction can be attributed
to the use of the vagueness doctrine more for the purpose of removing an economic weapon from statutory sanction than for the
purpose of insuring fair notice to potential offenders. 182 If such a
use is the substance of' the GI Surplus case, the result reached is to
be applauded. However, the means used to reach the result are
unfortunate because the vagueness issue veils this inferable holding
,and reduces the value of the case as a precedent. Viewed solely as
a vagueness case, it can be "hung on the rack" to be factually
distinguished in future cases. Hopefully, the many forces which
18
seem to' have forged and shaped the opinion will be appreciated.
The decision in GI Surplus, however, did not daunt the Sunday
law proponents. Within a year, the 1961 act was rewritten. 18 4 The
"vague" phrase exempting "necessary activity" was not made more
certain; it was deleted. The policy which stood back of the phrase
was totally abandoned.' Also, 'a provision in the 1961 act which
..
2Clark's Charlotte, Inc. v. Hunter, 261 N.C. 222, 134 S.E.2d 364
(1964) ; State v. Towery, 239 N.C. 274, 79 S.E.2d 513, appeal dismissed, 347
U.S. 925 (1954); and State v. McGee, 237 N.C. 633, 75 S.E.2d 783, appeal
disnnissed, 346 U.S. 802 (1953), do not detract from this conclusion. These
cases uphold municipal ordinances prohibiting all occupations generally on
Sunday with exceptions allowing certain business activities. The ordinances
were attacked on the ground that they contained unreasonable classification
distinction between stores allowed to open on Sunday and stores required to
close. The cases assune that the purpose of the Sunday ordinances involved
is to promote public health and welfare. See Clark's Charlotte, Inc. v. Hunter, supra at 228, 231, 134 S.E. at 368, 370. On that basis they allow unlimited
classification of types of businesses. If a search revealed that the purpose and
effect of the ordinances is more to suppress competition than to provide a day
of rest, the result should be the same as that which can be inferred from
G I Surplus-that the purpose underlying the Sunday laws is unconstitutional. See generally text accompanying notes 70-78 supra. The cases have
avoided the search. They uniformly say that competition between the classes
is not the test of reasonableness of the classification. This reasoning overlooks the fact that competition between the classes might have fostered
the classification, whereas differences in the types of businesses are only
incidentally involved. The reasoning of the court upholds an ordinance
where all businesses of a particular type (for instance department stores)
are required to close. Is this a sufficient test? Some stores within the
type might reap great economic advantage even though they have to remain closed. See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra. Labor might only
incidentally benefit.
. The "working room" of the court was partially restricted by the
pleadings. The sole attack on the statute was upon the vagueness charge.
Finding that tvo other jurisdictions (Kansas and Ohio) had accepted the
contention, the court did not go beyond it to expressly settle the ultimate
'power issue..
, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-346.2 (Supp. 1963). The new act retained the
substance of the 1961 act except as hereinafter noted.
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allowed local government units to exempt themselves from the act
was abandoned in response to a warning in GI Surplus'3 5 that it
might raise constitutional questions. But the effect of the latter
provision-lack of uniformity throughout the state-was partially
retained. The 1963 act exempted twenty-five counties totally and
portions of four others from its operation. The legislature justified
the exemption as being to meet the needs of people visiting "resort
or tourist" areas."3 6 This justification was expressly rejected in
Treasure City, Inc. v. Clark."Bt In this case the court, in reviewing
the 1963 act, said:
Consideration of the articles of merchandise to which the 1963
act applies (e.g., business or office furnishings) dispels the suggestion that there exists in a resort area or in a tourist area a
need for the sale of such merchandise on Sunday sufficiently
distinctive to constitute a reasonable basis for the separate classification of such areas with reference to the sale of such articles
of merchandise.1 88
Another explanation of the exemption of the large areas from the
act may be possible. The exemption may show that these otherwise unprotected areas are in no need of this type of legislation;
that the Sunday sale of the proscribed articles in these areas is not
really inimical to either the public health, safety, morals, or wel3
,fare."'
If this is the reason behind the exemption, the conclusion
that recent Sunday laws are a solution to private rather than public
'problems is strengthened. 40
The Treasure City case held the 1963 act unconstitutional. The
express holding was based on article II, section 29- of the North
Carolina Cofistitution, which provides in part:
111257 N.C. at 211, 125 S.E.2d at 768.
...
N.C. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 448, § 1.
261 N.C. 130, 134 S.E.2d 97 (1964).
1"T
88Id. at 134-35, 134 S.E2d at 100. The court might well have added
that the bill to rewrite the 1961 act had itself been amended to exempt
many of the counties before further amendment classified the exempted
counties as "resort or tourist areas." See Institute of Government Lgislative Service, Daily Bulletin, March 14, April 19, 22, May 9, 10, 17, 22
(1963) (legislative history of S.B. 141).
...
The thought was suggested in G I Surplus Stores, Inc. v. Hunter,
257 N.C. 206, 211, 125 S.E.2d 764, 767-68 (1962).
"' The fact that the General Assembly also expanded county powers by
allowing them for the first time to pass Sunday laws, N.C. GnN. STAT. §
153-9(55) (1964), does not explain the exemptions in the 1963 act. Sixteen counties and portions of three others are excepted from both N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-346.2, and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-9(55). These areas are
without effective Sunday laws.

%148

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. ,43

The General Assembly shall not pass any local, private or special
act or resolution... regulating labor for] trade.... The General Assembly shall have power to pass general laws regulating
matters set out in this section.
The court found that the act regulated trade, 4 ' was not a general
law, and therefore violated the constitutional provision. 142 As in
GI Surplus, the court neither searched for purpose nor reached the
ultimate power question of whether the purpose for which the
statute was enacted was constitutional.
However, a certain aura surrounding the recent decisions can-

not be overlooked. It indicates that the court is well aware that in
recent years the Sunday laws have taken on a new perspective;
that the banner for them is carried by business groups engaged in
a War of competition; and that when irritation for such legislation
comes only from particular interest groups, the objective to be
served should 'be questioned.
1

No mention was made that the act regulated labor. It does so only
indirectly.
' The mere fact that the act involved classification was not the defect.
-A general law may treat different parts of the state separately. But in
order for a law employing classification to be general, it must "apply to
and 'operate uniformly 'on all members of any class of persons, places or
things requiring legislation peculiar to itself in matters covered by the
law."' 261 N.C. at 135, 134 S.E.2d at 100. The court found that all areas
distinguished by characteristics sufficiently marked and important to make
'them clearly a class to be treated separately were not treated equally. Many
resort areas in North Carolina were not excepted. That finding alone
should have been enough to declare the act unconstitutional because even
though the legislature has wide discretion in making classification in statutes,
it must be based on tangible, intrinsic, germane distinctions and "must
affect all within the class uniformly." McIntyre v. Clarkson, 254 N.C. 510,
519, 119 S.E.2d 888, 894-95 (1961). If not it would be a denial of the
equal protection of law guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment and under N.C. CONST. art. I, § 17. Therefore Treasure City should be a valuable
precedent in the legislative classification field, where the courts have pteviously shown a notorious reluctance to supervise. Consider the classes
sustained in State v. Weddington, 188 N.C. 643, 125 S.E. 257 (1924).
The ordinance allowed the sale of meals on Sunday, and with them coffee,
tea, or milk. Defendant was subject to criminal conviction for the sale
of a Coca-Cola. Treasure City inferentially recognizes that the classification issue is the core of the case. The case arose as did G I Surplus in an
injunctive suit to test constitutionality. Both cases adopted the general rule
that constitutionality of an act cannot be challenged in a suit to enjoin its
enforcement but took exception because it "clearly" appeared necessary to
protect "fundamental human rights." G I Surplus Store, Inc. v. Hunter,
-257 N.C. 206, 214, 125 S.E.2d 764, 770 (1962). It seems clear that the
guarantee of equal protection is the right protected in Treasure City.
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POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

When the constitutionality of an objective is questionable,
policy considerations are generated. Ironically, these added policy
'considerations are 6ften overlooked in an effort to draft a law which
will withstand the constitutional test. The result is a law that may
not be suited to the present best interests of the state. A constitution "does not tell us what is presently wise. . . . [It] can do no
more than save us, in extreme cases, from folly."1 43 Therefore,
more attention should be directed to these policy considerations in
deciding whether this type of legislation should be enacted at all.
The legitimate end that Sunday laws allegedly achieve is the
procurement of a day of rest for the public. "A need for this kind
of supplementation of the laws protecting labor in North Carolina
has not been sufficiently shown by the proponents. 4 - Furthermore,
the disadvantages which are necessarily bound up in this type legislation seem to be overbalancing. Classification distinctions allowing certain business activities to continue while most businesses are
required to close are inescapable since many types -of Sunday lab6r
facilitate making Sunday a day of rest and recreation."4 5 The large
majority of these classifications in the past have extended beyond
the mere exemption of businesses for the purpose of making Sunday a more enjoyable day of rest and relaxation. 40 'Many distinctions made to allow one activity on Sunday and disallow another
have no logical explanation." These distinctions cause responsible
1" O'Toole, The Sunday Laws, 74 COMMONWEAL 343, 345, (1961).
...
The proponents have generally stated their purpose in sponsoring
Sunday legislation to be for "the protection and general welfare of the
'public as a whole and also for the protection of family life and for the
general welfare of the people as a whole, including the employee class."
Brief for the North Carolina Merchants Ass'n as Amicus Curiae, p. 20,
Treasure City, Inc. v. Clark, 261 N.C. 130, 134 S.E.2d 97 (1964).

...
Frankfurter discusses this problem in McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 524-43 (1961) (separate opinion).
" This extended classification results either from surrender to special
interest groups or from the use of inadvertent language which is too
specific. See generally Editorial Note, 12 RUTGERS L. REv. 505, 511-12
(1958). Consider the 1962 Charlotte ordinance excepting real estate dealers; the 1961 act allowing wholesale but not retail sales; and the Asheville
ordinance allowing sale of ice cream but not sherbert, milk or butter. Brief
for Appellant, p. 5, State v. Trantham, 230 N.C. 641, 55 S.E.2d 198 (1949).
1" See the classifications sustained in State v. Weddington, 188' N.C.
,643, 125 S.E. 257 (1927), and in State v. Trantham, supra note 146. The
classifications in the Sunday closing ordinance adopted by Charlotte in 1962,

N.C., CODE § 13-56 (1964), were widely criticized. A Charlotte
Observer editorial said that '"under the ordinance, as we read it, a drug
CiA.RLoTTE,
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public officials-even the most learned in the law-to regard the
Sunday laws as "nothing short of ridiculous,"' 48 "a miserable
farce,"' 49 "tyrannical,"' 50 and an "unbelievable hodgepodge"'5 1
causing a "vexing state of uncertainty and widespread confusion...
so notorious as to be the subject of judicial notice."'1

2

The classi-

fication used in state-wide Sunday laws has also failed to recognize the fact that "the tranquility of the country town may admit
of different regulations than the discordant and sometimes raucous
153
atmosphere of the growing cities."
1 4
The Sunday laws are conducive to sporadic enforcement,
store may sell a Sunday patron a Band-Aid, but woe be to the food store
that does. A golf shop may peddle its golf balls on Sunday, but the sport-

ing goods section of a drug store will have to be roped off." Charlotte
Observer, Feb. 4, 1964, § B, p. 2, col. 1. Furthermore, an exemption to
allow "emergency repair services" on Sunday was deleted from the final
draft of the ordinance. This deletion seems to indicate, for example, that
plumbing or automobile repairs would not be allowed on Sunday even in
an emergency. Charlotte Observer, March 6, 1964, § C, p. 2, col. 2.
"'Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S.
582, 591 n.6 (1961).
""Cheeves v. State, 5 Okla. Crim. 361, 365, 114 Pac. 1125, 1126 (1911).
... Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (dictum) (Holmes,
J., dissenting).
..
1 Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc. v. Gallagher, 176 F. Supp. 466,
472 (D. Mass. 1959), rev'd, 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
. Harvey v. Priest, 366 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Mo. 1963).
1.. Letter From John T. Morrisey, Sr., Charlotte City Attorney, to Brown
Hill Boswell, Sept. 15, 1964.
..Enforcement has been neglected throughout the history of Sunday
laws. LEFLAR & NEWSomE, NORTH CAROLINA 125 (1954); MYER,Y- OLDEN
BLUE LAWS 115-16, 119 (1921); 3 SAUNDERS, THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF
NORTH CAROLINA 180 (1886) (1715 act "too little regarded"). See generally WHITAxER, THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLISH SUNDAY 52-84 (1940).

Even after the 1962 Charlotte ordinance was upheld by the North Carolina Supreme Court, the Charlotte Police Chief said that police would not
take the initiative nor stringently enforce it. Charlotte Observer, Feb. 3,
1964, § B, p. 1, col. 1. The fact that a short period of accommodation is a
customary prelude to strict enforcement of a new penal statute may explain the statement of the Charlotte Police Chief. Correspondence From
John T. Morrisey, Sr., Charlotte City Attorney, to Brown Hill Boswell,
Sept. 15, 1964. The Charlotte ordinance was repealed before it grew out
of this accommodation period. Ibid. However, other public officials have
expressed the same general attitude toward Sunday laws which have been
"in force" for periods of time long past the accommodation stage. For
instance, the District Attorney of Lehigh County, Pa., admitted the intentional absence of Sunday law enforcement for many years. Nader, BlueLaw Blues, 192 NATION 499, 500 (1961). One reason for lack of enforcement is the administrative unworkability. In Spartanburg County, S.C.,
opponents of the Sunday laws demanded enforcement against all violators
in an effort to demonstrate the administrative unworkability. In three Sundays of enforcement police netted one thousand arrests. Sheriffs and judges
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which not only necessarily creates an attitude of disrespect by the
public for the authority of the law,', but which also is "hardly
compatible with the characterization of the statute as a vehicle with
which the state seeks to promote the public health and welfare."' 5
Sporadic enforcement is also inconsistent with a fundamental
principle of ordered liberty: the assurance of "responsible control
over the scope and probable'regularity of exercise of governmental
force. '1 5 7 Another significant disadvantage of the Sunday laws is
that minority religious beliefs are made more expensive than the
beliefs of the majority 5 8 This disadvantage, perhaps more than
any other, has caused the view that restriction of Sunday activity,
should come about by voluntary agreement between individuals and
not by government force 9 to gain considerable support.16° , The
complained. It cost the state $25 to collect a $1 fine. Nevertheless, the law:
stayed on the books while enforcement lapsed and Sunday selling resumed..
Shaffer, Sunday SeUing, 1960 EDITORIAL RESEARcH REPORTS 119, 127,-28.
' For comments of the Governor of Utah on this aspect, see id. at 136:
See generally Editorial Note, 12 RUTGERS L. REv. 505, 508 (1958).
.
Note, 37 IND. L.J. 397, 415 (1962).
""Note,
109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 90 (1960).
158
The burden imposed on minority religious beliefs runs throughout
the history of this type of law, causing an early writer to remark: "No,
man can peruse these laws without a chill inevery vein, and be 'ready todisbelieve that so uncharitable a spirit could ever have existed and been'
exercised in America, in a country whose freedom, civilly and religiously
considered, was its boast.. . ." THE BLUE LAws o NEw HAVEN COLONY
at v (1838). That the burdens still exist today-though in less degree-is
not denied. Consider the language of Warren: "[T]he statute at bar does
not make unlawful any religious practices.

.

."; it simply makes the practice

"more expensive." Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961). Justice
Frankfurter says: "[T]he measure of the burden is not . . . beyond the

ower of the individual to alter." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
21 (1961) (separate opinion). Frankfurter adds that the severity of the
burden "might be offset by the industry and commercial initiative of the
individual merchant." Ibid. Might not this line of thought maintain any,
oppressive statute?
...
This view is stated by Douglas in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 563 (1961) (dissenting opinion). See generally Fell, Blue Laws-A
Minority Opinion, 76 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1375 (1959); Shaffer, supra
note
154,
at 136.
* ,
A 1962
'resolution by the United Presbyterians' General Assembly
said: "The church should not seek nor even appear to seek, the coercive
power of the state in order to facilitate the Christian's observance of the
Lord's Day." Newsweek, June 18, 1962, p. 77. A 1959 report by the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. said: "[T]he
general consensus, coming from numerous areas where community-wide
efforts against economic encroachments on Sunday have developed, points
unquestionably to the greater value and dependability of solutions reached
by voluntary agreement rather than by legislative fiat." Quoted in Shaffer,
vupra note 154, at 123-24.
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step away from legislation burdened with such difficult problems of
constitutionality and policy is commendable.
BROWN HILL BOSWELL

Administrative Law-judicial Review-Procedural Due Process in
Student Disciplinary Proceedings
1
the petitioner, having been
In the recent case of lit re Carter,
Carolina at Chapel Hill on
of
North
the
University
from
suspended
a charge of cheating on a quiz, appealed to the state courts for
judicial review. The trial court ruled that the evidence offered
against the petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of innocence,
that the conviction was therefore not in accordance with due process,
and that to deny petitioner readmission on the evidence presented
would be arbitrary and capricious. But because additional evidence
had been disclosed at the trial, the court remanded the case to the
Board of Trustees to refer to the proper administrative authorities
for a review taking account of the new evidence. Petitioner took
no exception to this order and made no appeal, but moved before
a, subsequent term of court that an order be issued to the Board of
Trustees to show cause why an order should not be issued reversing
the suspension and directing correction of University records accordingly. It was held that until the administrative hearing on
remand was held, petitioner had not exhausted her administrative
remedies; the motion and order to show cause were dismissed.
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. Delegation of authority by the Board of Trustees in
matters of student suspension was upheld as "proper and constitutional. ' ' 2 The decision of the Board of Trustees upholding the student honor council and the Chancellor was held to be "the administrative decision of a State board authorized by the Constitution
and statutes of the State to make administrative decisions . . . "a
and the petitioner was thus held to be entitled to judicial review
under the state statutes 4 granting review of administrative decisions.
The Cartercase thus establishes beyond doubt the jurisdiction of the
1262 N.C. 360, 137 S.E.2d 150 (1964).
Id. at 372, 137 S.E.2d at 158.
*Id. at 372, 137 S.E.2d at 159.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-306 to -316 (1953).

